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Abstract. With their increasing popularity in cryptosystems, biomet-
rics have attracted more and more attention from the information secu-
rity community. However, how to handle the relevant privacy concerns
remains to be troublesome. In this paper, we propose a novel security
model to formalize the privacy concerns in biometric-based remote au-
thentication schemes. Our security model covers a number of practical
privacy concerns such as identity privacy and transaction anonymity,
which have not been formally considered in the literature. In addition,
we propose a general biometric-based remote authentication scheme and
prove its security in our security model.
1 Introduction
Privacy has become an important issue in many aspects of our daily life, especially
in an era of networking where information access may go far beyond our control.
When sensitive information such as biometrics is used, the privacy issues become
even more important because corruption of such information may be catastrophic
for the relevant applications. In this paper we focus on the issue of handling the
privacy concerns in remote biometric-based authentication schemes.
1.1 Related Work
Biometrics, such as fingerprint and iris, have been used to a higher level of secu-
rity in order to cope with the increasing demand for reliable and highly-usable
information security systems, because they have many advantages over typical
cryptographic credentials. For example, biometrics are believed to be unique, un-
forgettable, non-transferable, and they do not need to be stored. One of the most
important application areas is biometric-based authentication schemes, where an
authentication is simply a comparison between a reference biometric template
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and a new template extracted during the authentication process. Note that,
depending on the type of biometrics, comparison may mean image matching,
binary string matching, etc.
Despite of its advantages, in practice, there are some obstacles in a wide
adoption of biometrics.
First, biometrics are only approximately stable over the time, therefore,
they cannot be directly integrated into most of the existing systems. To ad-
dress this issue, error-correction concept is widely used in the literature (e.g.
[3,4,8,10,11,18,19,25,29]). Employing this concept, some intermediate informa-
tion (referred to as helper data in some work) is firstly generated based on a
reference biometric template, and later, a newly-extracted template could help
to recover the reference template or some relevant information if the distance
between the templates is small enough (depending on the type of biometrics).
Instead of employing this concept, a number of authors also suggest to compare
biometric templates directly (e.g. [1,12,34]). Atallah et al. [1] propose a method,
in which biometric templates are treated as bit strings and subsequently masked
and permuted during the authentication process. Du and Atallah [12,34] investi-
gate a number of biometric comparison scenarios by employing secure multiparty
computation techniques. Schoenmakers and Tuyls [27] propose to use homo-
morphic encryption schemes for biometric authentication schemes by employing
multi-party computation techniques.
Second, biometrics are usually regarded to be sensitive because they uniquely
identify an individual. The sensitivity of biometrics lies in the fact that disclo-
sure of biometrics in a certain application leads to the disclosure of the true
identity of the involved users in this application. In addition, if the same type
of biometrics of a user is used in two applications, then there is an undeni-
able link for the user’s activities in both applications. Nonetheless, it is worth
stressing that biometrics are normally considered to be public information. In
[20,28,29,31,33], the authors attempt to enhance privacy protection in biomet-
ric authentication schemes, where the privacy means that the compromise of
the database will not enable the adversary to recover the biometric template.
Ratha, Connell, and Bolle [2,24] introduce the concept of cancelable biometrics
in an attempt to solve the revocation and privacy issues related to biometric
information. Ratha et al. [23] intensively elaborate this concept in the case of
fingerprint-based authentication systems. Recently, Bringer et al. [5,6] propose a
number of biometric-based authentication protocols which protect the sensitive
relationship between a biometric feature and relevant pseudorandom username.
Practical concerns, security issues, and challenges about biometrics have been
intensively discussed in the literature (e.g. [2,17,21,24,26,32]). Tuyls, Skoric, and
Kevenaar [30] present a summary of cryptographic techniques for dealing with
biometrics.
1.2 Motivation and Contributions
The stability problem concerned with biometric measurements has been paid
pretty much attention and investigated very well at this moment. However,
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privacy issues concerned with biometrics have not been understood well. With
respect to biometric-based authentication schemes, we do not have a general
formalization of privacy concerns based on a clear system structure. In practice,
privacy may mean much more than the adversary cannot recover the user’s bio-
metric template. For instance, a user may also want the relationship between
its biometric template and username to remain secret in a service, where the
user uses a personalized (pseudorandom) username instead of his true name.
This requirement might become much stronger if the user wants to multiple
registrations under different usernames at the service provider.
In the rest of this paper, we consider the following scenario for biometric-based
authentication schemes: Suppose a human user registers at a service provider
to consume some service and would like to authenticate himself to the service
provider using his biometric (say, his iris). Typically, the user will choose a
personalized username and register his reference biometric information under
this username. In order to authenticate himself to the service provider, the user
presents his username and some fresh biometric information, and then the service
provider will perform a matching between the reference biometric information
and the fresh biometric information. The contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows.
First, we propose a new system structure for biometric-based remote authen-
tication schemes. In the new structure, there are four types of components,
including human user, sensor client, service provider, and database. There are
two motivations for us to assume sensor client and service provider to be inde-
pendent, which means the service provider does not control the sensor client.
1. One is to protect human users’ privacy against a malicious service provider.
If a malicious service provider controls the sensor client, then it can easily
obtain human users’ biometric information and potentially manipulate the
information.
2. The other is based on the fact that human users may wish to access the
service provider wherever they are. In this case, it is natural to make the
assumption that sensor client could be provided by another party which has
business agreement with the service provider.
Different from any previous system, the database is assumed to be indepen-
dent from the service provider and serve as a secure storage for biometric infor-
mation. The motivations for the detachment are as follows.
1. The first is that a user may not trust a service provider to store his biometric
template regardless of the transformation which might be applied to the
template.
2. The second is that the service provider’s access to the biometric information
can be minimized, so is the database’s access. This structure makes it pos-
sible to protect human users’ privacy against a malicious service provider
or a malicious database. Under the traditional structure, where the service
A Formal Study of the Privacy Concerns 59
provider controls the database, we do not see how to achieve our privacy
goal1.
3. The third is that, in practice, the service provider has avoided the responsi-
bility for storing biometric templates. As data breaches for service providers
are reported more and more frequently nowdays, the need for the separation
becomes stronger and stronger.
With respect to the new structure, we formalize the following attributes re-
lated to privacy concerns which have not been formally considered in the liter-
ature.
– The security for private relationship between personalized username and
biometric template is defined to be an attribute identity privacy.
– The security for user’s transaction statistics is defined to be an attribute
transaction anonymity.
Note that, for non biometric-based (authentication) schemes, the requirement of
identity privacy might not be as significant as in our case because cryptographic
credentials are not bound to an individual permanently.
Second, we propose a general biometric-based remote authentication scheme
by employing a Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol [7,9,15] and the
ElGamal public-key encryption scheme [13]. The security of the scheme is based
on the semantic security of ElGamal, namely the DDH assumption. Instead of
ElGamal, other homomorphic encryption schemes can also be used for the same
purpose but the computational load will stay in a similar level. Our proposal is
not focused on a specific biometric, but rather on such type of biometrics that can
be represented as binary strings in the Hamming space and authentication can
be done through a binary string matching. For example, iris is one type of such
biometrics [16]. For other biometrics, how to construct a secure authentication
scheme in our security model remains as an open problem.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide some prelim-
inary definitions. In Section 3 we provide the security and privacy definitions for
biometric-based remote authentication schemes. In Section 4 we present a new
biometric-based remote authentication scheme. In Section 5 we provide security
analysis for the new scheme in our security model. In Section 6 we conclude the
paper.
2 Preliminary Definitions
2.1 The System Structure
In the new system structure for biometric-based authentication schemes, we
consider four types of components.
1 Especially, applying a one-way function to the biometric template will not be enough
to achieve our privacy goal.
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– Human user, which uses his biometric to authenticate himself to a service
provider.
– Sensor client, which captures the raw biometric data and extracts a biometric
template, and communicates with the service provider.
– Service provider, which deals with human user’s authentication request by
querying the database.
– Database, which stores biometric information for users, and works as a bio-
metric template matcher by providing the matching service to the service
provider.
Remark 1. Different from the local authentication environment, sensor client
and service provider are assumed to be independent components in our struc-
ture. We consider this to be an appropriate assumption in the remote authen-
tication environment, where human users access the service provider through
sensor clients, which are not owned by the service provider but have a business
agreement with the service provider.
Remark 2. In practice, there might be only very few organizations that can be
trusted by human users to store their biometric information though they may
want to use their biometrics for the authentication purpose at many service
providers. Therefore, in practice we suggest an scenario like that of Single Sign-
On systems [22], where biometric information for all service providers are cen-
tralizedly stored and managed. In addition, in our security model the centralized
database won’t be a bottleneck in the sense of security.
For the simplicity of description, in the following discussions, we assume N users
Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ N) register at a service provider S, these users authenticate them-
selves through a sensor client C2, and the database is denoted as DB. Moreover,
we would expect users to conduct their authentication services at different ser-
vice providers while registering their biometric templates in the same (trusted)
database.
2.2 The Authentication Workflow
Like most existing biometric-based cryptosystems, we also assume that a
biometric-based authentication scheme consists of two phases: an enrollment
phase and a verification phase.
1. In the enrollment phase, user Ui registers his reference biometric informa-
tion, which is computed based on his reference biometric template bi, at the
database DB and his personalized username IDi at the service provider S.
Note that a human user may have multiple registrations at the same service
provider.
2. In the verification phase, user Ui issues an authentication request to the
service provider S through the sensor client C. S matches Ui’s biometric
templates with help from the database DB.
2 In practice, there may be a number of sensor clients for human users to access the
service provider, but this simplification will not affect our security result.
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2.3 Assumptions and Trust Relationships
We make the following assumptions.
1. Biometric Distribution assumption: Let H be the distance function in a met-
ric space (in this paper, we assume it to be Hamming space). Suppose bi
and bj are the reference biometric templates for Alice and Bob, respectively.
There is a threshold value λ, the probability that H(bi, b′j) > λ is close to 1
and the probability that H(bi, b′i) ≤ λ is close to 1, where b′i and b′j are the
templates captured for Alice and Bob at any time.
2. Liveness assumption: We assume that, with a high probability, the biometric
template captured by the sensor is from a live human user. In other words,
it is difficult to produce a fake biometric template that can be accepted by
the sensor.
3. Security link assumption: The communication links between components are
protected with confidentiality and integrity. In practice, the security links can
be implemented using a standard protocol such as SSL or TLS.
The biometric distribution and the liveness assumptions are indispensable for
most of biometric-based cryptosystems and they are considered as a prerequisite
for the adoption of biometrics. Note that biometrics are public information,
additional credentials are always required to establish security links in order to
prevent some well-known attacks (e.g. replay attacks). Therefore, the security
link assumption is indeed also assumed in most cryptosystems, though it is not
as standard as others.
In a biometric-based authentication system, we assume the following trust
relationships.
1. Sensor client is always honest and trusted by all other components. By as-
suming this trust relationship, the liveness assumption is extended from sen-
sor client to service provider in the following sense: when the service provider
receives a username and some fresh biometric information, it can confirm
with a high probability that the the fresh biometric information is extracted
from a human user which has presented the username to the sensor client.
2. With respect to authentication service, service provider is trusted by human
users to make the right decision, and database is trusted by human users and
the service provider to store and provide the right biometric information.
Only an outside adversary may try to impersonate an honest human user.
3. With respect to privacy concerns, both service provider and database are
assumed to be malicious which means they may deviate from the protocol
specification, but they will not collude. In reality, an outside adversary may
also pose threats to the privacy concerns, however, it has no more advantage
than a malicious system component.
3 Security Model for Biometric-Based Authentication
We first describe some conventions for writing probabilistic algorithms and ex-
periments. The notation x R← S means x is randomly chosen from the set S.
62 Q. Tang et al.
If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then A(Alg;Func) is the result of running A,
which can have any polynomial number of oracle queries to the functionality
Func, interactively with Alg which answers the oracle queries issued by A. For
the clarity of description, if an algorithm A runs in a number of stages then we
write A = (A1,A2, · · · ). As a standard practice, the security of a protocol is
evaluated by an experiment between an adversary and a challenger, where the
challenger simulates the protocol executions and answers the adversary’s oracle
queries. Without specification, algorithms are always assumed to be polynomial-
time and the security parameter is assumed to be .
Specifically, in our case, there are two functionalities Enrollment and
Verification, where Enrollment can be initiated only once to simulate the enroll-
ment phase and Verification can be initiated for any user to start an authentica-
tion session for any polynomial times. Without loss of generality, if Verification
is initiated for Ui, we write Verification(i).
In addition, we have the following definitions for negligible and overwhelming
probabilities.
Definition 1. The function P () : Z → R is said to be negligible if, for every
polynomial f(), there exists an integer Nf such that P () ≤ 1f() for all  ≥ Nf .
If P () is negligible, then the probability 1− P () is said to be overwhelming.
3.1 Soundness and Impersonation Resilience
Definition 2. A biometric-based authentication scheme is defined to be sound
if it satisfies the following two requirements:
1. With an overwhelming probability, the service provider will accept an au-
thentication request in the following case: sensor client sends (IDi, b) in an
authentication request, where H(b, bi) ≤ λ and bi is the reference template
registered for IDi.
2. With an overwhelming probability, the service provider will reject an au-
thentication request in the following case: sensor client sends (IDi, b) in an
authentication request, where H(b, bi) > λ and bi is the reference template
registered for IDi.
If b, where H(b, bi) ≤ λ, is extracted from a user different from the user registered
under bi, then we say false accept occurs. Otherwise, if b, where H(b, bi) > λ,
is extracted from the user registered under bi, then we say false reject occurs.
From a cryptographic point of view, the false reject rate and the false accept
rate may be very high. However, this issue is irrelevant to our privacy concerns,
hence, how to handle them is beyond the scope of our paper.
For authentication schemes, impersonation resilience should be the primary
goal, nonetheless, under the security link assumption and the liveness assump-
tion, soundness implies impersonation resilience in our case so that we omit the
formalization.
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3.2 Identity Privacy
In practice, a malicious service provider or a malicious database may try to
probe the relationships between personalized usernames and biometric tem-
plates, though they do not need such information in order to make the system
work. Informally, the attribute identity privacy means that, for any personal-
ized username, the adversary knows nothing about the corresponding biometric
template. It also implies that the adversary cannot find any linkability between
registrations in the case that the same human user has multiple registrations at
the service provider.
Definition 3. A biometric-based authentication scheme achieves identity pri-
vacy if A = (A1,A2) has only a negligible advantage in the following game,
where the advantage is defined to be |Pr[e′ = e]− 12 |.
ExpIdentity-PrivacyA
(i, IDi, b
(0)
i , b
(1)
i , (IDj , bj)(j = i)) ← A1(1)
bi = b
(e)
i
R← {b(0)i , b(1)i }
∅ ← Enrollment(1)
e′ ← A2(Challenger;Verification)
Note that the symbol ∅ means that there is no explicit output (besides the state
information) for the adversary. In the experiment, presumably, the adversary
A2 will obtain the corresponding information3 from the challenger. The attack
game can be informally rephrased as follows:
1. The adversary A1 generates N pairs of username and relevant biometric
template, but provides two possible templates (b(0)i , b
(1)
i ) for IDi.
2. The challenger randomly chooses a template b(e)i for the username IDi, and
simulates the enrollment phase to generate the parameter for the sensor
client, the service provider, and the database.
3. The adversaryA2 can initiate any (polynomial) number of protocol instances
for the verification protocol, and terminates by outputting guess e′.
In this definition (and Definition 4), the adversary can freely choose the user-
name and biometric template pairs for the enrollment phase, therefore, it models
the security for any type of biometric regardless of its distribution in practice. It
is worth stressing that, if a scheme achieves identity privacy, then neither a ma-
licious service provider or a malicious database (or an outside adversary which
has compromised any of them) can recover any registered biometric template.
As to our knowledge, none of the existing biometric-based authentication
schemes (including those in Section 1) achieve identity privacy under our defini-
tion. Informally, these scheme suffers from the following vulnerability: Suppose
that human users use their iris to authenticate themselves to a service provider S.
3 The information refers to that of the malicious component at the end of the enroll-
ment phase.
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If S is malicious (or a hacker which has compromised the biometric database of
S), then it can easily determine whether a human being, say Alice, has registered.
3.3 Transaction Anonymity
Since the database is supposed to store biometric information, therefore, it might
obtain some transaction statistics about the service provider and registered hu-
man users. Informally, the attribute transaction anonymity means that, for every
query issued by the service provider, a malicious database knows nothing about
which user is authenticating himself to the service provider.
Definition 4. A biometric-based authentication scheme achieves transaction
anonymity if an adversary A = (A1,A2,A3) has only a negligible advantage
in the following game, where the advantage is defined to be |Pr[e′ = e]− 12 |.
ExpTransaction-AnonymityA
(IDj , bj)(1 ≤ j ≤ N) ← A1(1)
∅ ← Enrollment(1)
{i0, i1} ← A2(Challenger,Verification)
ie
R← {i0, i1}
∅ ← Verification(ie)
e′ ← A3(Challenger;Verification)
As the adversary is a malicious database, presumably the adversary A2 will
obtain the corresponding information from the challenger. The attack game can
be informally rephrased as follows:
1. The adversary A1 generates N pairs of username and relevant biometric
template.
2. The challenger simulates the enrollment phase to generate the parameters.
3. The adversary A2 can then initiate any (polynomial) number of protocol
instances for the verification protocol. At some point, A2 chooses two users
Ui0 , Ui1 and asks the challenger to initiate an instance for the verification
protocol.
4. The challenger chooses Uie and initiates an instance for the verification
protocol.
5. The adversary A3 can continue to initiate any number of protocol instances,
and terminates by outputting guess e′.
4 A General Biometric-Based Authentication Scheme
In this section we describe a general biometric-based authentication scheme,
where the biometric template matching can be done through binary string com-
parison. We first describe the enrollment phase and the verification phase, and
then provide some remarks.
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4.1 The Enrollment Phase
In the enrollment phase, every component initializes its parameters as follows.
– C generates a key pair (pkc, skc) for a signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign,Verify)
and publishes the public key pkc. In addition, C implements a (M,m, m˜, λ)-
secure sketch scheme (SS,Rec) [11], where M is the space of biometric tem-
plate, m and m˜ can be any values, and λ is the threshold value in the
biometric distribution assumption described in Section 2.3.
– DB generates an ElGamal key pair (pkdb, skdb), where pkdb =
(Gdb, qdb, gdb, ydb), ydb = gxdbdb , and skdb = xdb, and publishes pkdb.
– S generates an ElGamal key pair (pks, sks), where pks = (Gs, qs, gs, ys),
Gs = Gdb, gs = gdb, ys = gxss , and sks = xs, and publishes pks.
– Ui generates his personalized username IDi and registers it at the service
provider S, and registers Bi at the database DB, where bi is Ui’s reference
biometric template and
Bi = Enc((gs)IDs||IDi||bi , pks)
= (Bi1, Bi2)
Note that Bi has two components since the encryption scheme is ElGamal.
In addition, Ui (publicly) stores a sketch sketchi = SS(bi).
4.2 The Verification Phase
If Ui wants to authenticate himself to the service provider S through the sensor
client C, they perform as follows.
1. The sensor client C extracts Ui’s biometric template b∗i and computes
the adjusted template b′i = Rec(b
∗
i , sketchi). If H(b
∗
i , b
′
i) ≤ λ, C sends
(IDi,Mi1,Mi2, σi) to the service provider S, where
Xi = Enc((gs)IDs||IDi||b
′
i , pks)
= (Xi1, Xi2),
Mi1 = Enc(Xi1, pkdb), Mi2 = Enc(Xi2, pkdb),
σi = Sign(IDs||Mi1||Mi2, skc).
Otherwise, C aborts the operation.
2. S first retrieves the index i for IDi and then forwards (Mi1,Mi2, σi) to the
database DB.
3. DB first verifies the signature σi. If the verification succeeds, DB decrypts
Mi1 and Mi2 to recover Xi. For every 1 ≤  ≤ N , the database randomly
selects st ∈ Zqs and computes Rt = (Xi 	 B)st , where, for any integer x
and two ElGamal ciphertexts (c1, c2) and (c3, c4), the operator 	 is defined
as follows: ((c1, c2)	 (c3, c4))x = (( c1c3 )x, ( c2c4 )x).
4. The server runs a PIR protocol to retrieve Ri. If Dec(Ri, sks) = 1, S accepts
the request; otherwise rejects it.
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4.3 Remarks on the Proposed Scheme
It is well known that, with ElGamal scheme, we need to encode the plaintext in
a certain way in order to obtain semantic security, however, there is no encoding
method which will fully preserve the homomorphic property. In our case, we set
Gs = Gdb and gs = gdb, so that all plaintexts are exponentiations of gs and we
avoid the encoding problem.
Under the original definition given in [11], a secure sketch scheme is typically
used to preserve the entropy of the input and allow the reconstruction of the
input in the presence of a certain amount of noise. In our case, we only need
the second functionality, namely the secure sketch scheme is used to remove the
noise in the fresh biometric template. Therefore, we allow the parameters m and
m˜ to be any values. The choice of λ depends on both the type of biometric and
the underlying application’s requirements on false accept and false reject rates.
User Ui does not need to register any information, either public or private,
at the sensor client, though it need to store some public information, namely
the secure sketch. The authentication is conducted through an exact equivalence
comparison between the reference template and the adjusted fresh template (say,
the output from the secure sketch scheme). As a result, we avoid the need to
perform approximate biometric matchings on the service provider side and are
able to use the underlying cryptographic techniques. This makes the scheme
more scalable and flexible than other similar schemes. Compared with the exist-
ing remote authentication schemes (e.g. those in [3,4,8]), the proposed scheme
demonstrates our concept of detaching biometric information storage from the
service provider and shows a way to enhance human users’ privacy in practice.
In addition, our scheme also demonstrates a method to transform the existing
schemes to satisfy our security definition, i.e. using a combination of plaintext
equivalence test and PIR.
The computational complexity is dominated by that of the databaseDB which
has to perform O(N) exponentiations, the sensor client needs to perform 6 ex-
ponentiations and sign one message for each authentication attempt, while the
service provider only needs to decrypt one message (one exponentiation) to make
a decision. In addition, there is some computational load in running the PIR pro-
tocol. The communication complexity is dominated by the PIR protocol. If it
is instantiated to be the single-database PIR protocol of Gentry and Ramzan
[14], then the communication complexity between the service provider and the
database is O( + d), where d is the bit-length of an ElGamal ciphertext and
 ≥ logN is the security parameter.
5 Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
5.1 Soundness and Impersonation Resilience
From the biometric distribution assumption and the soundness of the secure
sketch, it is straightforward to verify that the proposed authentication scheme
is sound under Definition 2. In addition, Ui’s biometric templates bi and b′i are
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encoded in the form (gs)IDs||IDi||bi and (gs)IDs||IDi||b
′
i . Hence, if the entropy of
the adopted biometric is high, then the service provider and the database, even
if they collude, cannot recover the biometric templates based on the Discrete
Logarithm assumption.
5.2 Security Proof for Identity Privacy
In the verification protocol, even if security sketch is adopted, it is not guaranteed
that b′i = bi. Therefore, in the security proof, we assume that the difference
pattern, i.e. the distribution of b′i − bi mod q, is denoted as patterni. In fact,
the security results are independent from the difference patterns. Due to the
page limit, the proofs for both lemmas will appear in the full version of this
paper.
Lemma 1. The proposed scheme achieves identity privacy against malicious
S, based on the semantic security of the ElGamal scheme and the existential
unforgeability of the signature scheme.
Lemma 2. The proposed scheme achieves identity privacy against malicious
DB, based on the semantic security of the ElGamal scheme.
5.3 Security Proof for Transaction Anonymity
We next show that the proposed scheme achieves transaction anonymity. The
proof of this lemma will appear in the full version of this paper.
Lemma 3. The proposed scheme achieves transaction anonymity against mali-
cious DB, based on the semantic security of the ElGamal scheme and the security
(user privacy) of the PIR protocol.
5.4 Further Remarks
In our security analysis, as to an outside adversary, we only considered the case
where it has not compromised any system component. If the adversary has com-
promised the sensor client C, then it may impersonate an honest user to the
service provider if it obtains this user’s biometric template (note that biometrics
are public information). This is a common problem for many authentication sys-
tems, unless we adopt a tamper-resistant sensor client. If the adversary has com-
promised the service provider S or the database DB, then the identity privacy
property is still preserved. A possible vulnerability when DB is compromised is
that it may be able to impersonate any user in the system by impersonating
DB to the service provider. Again, this is a common problem for most authen-
tication systems, and one possible solution is to adopt a layered security design.
For example, tamper-resistant hardware can be used for establishing commu-
nication links. Then, even if the adversary has compromised the database, the
ciphertexts of biometric templates will not help him to impersonate any honest
user.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a specifically-tailored system structure and se-
curity model for biometric-based authentication schemes. In our security model,
we describe two privacy properties, namely identity privacy and transaction
anonymity, which are believed to be serious concerns because of the uniqueness
of biometrics. We have also proposed a general authentication scheme which
fulfills the security properties described in our security model. An interesting
characteristic of our scheme is that, assuming biometric template and secure
sketch to be public, a user does not need to store any private information and
register any information at the sensor client. In addition, the security require-
ments on the secure sketch scheme can be greatly relaxed (entropy preservation
is not required). As a further research direction, it is interesting to investigate
more efficient solutions in our security model.
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